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dc.contributor.authorKim, Bum J.en
dc.contributor.authorSchlesinger, Harrisen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18856-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance might be some type of government-sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1217en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH29en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen
dc.subject.keywordgovernment reliefen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwSubventionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAdverse selection in an insurance market with government-guaranteed subsistence levels-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856674346en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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