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dc.contributor.authorLuporini, Annalisaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:51Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18784-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to thesame owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets.Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variablerepresenting market conditions, the problem takes the form of a principal multi-agent model.We first provide appropriate extensions of the MLR and CDF conditions that ensure thevalidity of the first-order approach in the single agent case. Then, we show that affiliation ofthe random variables is a necessary and sufficient condition for the compensation of onedirector to negatively and monotonically depend on the performance of the other.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1420en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent problemsen
dc.subject.keywordrelative performance evaluationen
dc.subject.keywordfirst-order approachen
dc.subject.keywordmonotone likelihood ratioen
dc.subject.keywordaffiliationen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwOrganschaften
dc.subject.stwMathematische Optimierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRelative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn484552201en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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