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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18784
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Luporini, Annalisa | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18784 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to thesame owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets.Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variablerepresenting market conditions, the problem takes the form of a principal multi-agent model.We first provide appropriate extensions of the MLR and CDF conditions that ensure thevalidity of the first-order approach in the single agent case. Then, we show that affiliation ofthe random variables is a necessary and sufficient condition for the compensation of onedirector to negatively and monotonically depend on the performance of the other. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1420 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D23 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | principal-agent problems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | relative performance evaluation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | first-order approach | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monotone likelihood ratio | en |
dc.subject.keyword | affiliation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsorientierte Vergütung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Führungskräfte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Organschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mathematische Optimierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 484552201 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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