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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Berlemann, Michael | en |
dc.contributor.author | Dittrich, Marcus | en |
dc.contributor.author | Markwardt, Gunther | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18715 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of thepossibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goodssettings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a publicgood might be motivated by some form of joy of giving. We show that the possibility to makenon-binding announcements has a positive effect on cooperative behaviour, especially ifindividual announcements and factual investments are communicated to the players after eachround. We also show that this result holds true even though the players have an incentive tooverstate their true degrees of cooperativeness. Altogether, our theoretical considerationspoint in the direction that revealing as much information on individual intentions and factualbehaviour as possible enhances cooperative behaviour. These conclusions are broadlyconfirmed by the results of a series of classroom experiments we present. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1352 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | announcements | en |
dc.subject.keyword | joy of giving | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experimental economics | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Experiment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ankündigungseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Altruismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments : some theory and experimental evidence | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477414303 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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