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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Berger, Helge | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mueller, Till | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, inparticular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in theCouncil. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bankaddressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish toinsulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and theattempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economicshocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, andneither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that thepattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might beextreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1344 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E58 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Central Bank | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Federal Central Bank | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Currency Union | en |
dc.subject.keyword | optimal representation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | voting | en |
dc.subject.keyword | ECB | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zentralbank | en |
dc.subject.stw | Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Abstimmungsregel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Landesgrösse | en |
dc.subject.stw | Geldpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | EU-Staaten | en |
dc.title | How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477413463 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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