Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/17935 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorGraves, Philip E.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:05:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:05:03Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/17935-
dc.description.abstractElected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary rules are seen as necessary to constrain politicians? tax and spending behavior. Popular among such constraints are various Balanced Budget Amendment proposals. These approaches, however, are shown here to have serious limitations, including failure to address the central concern of spending level. An alternative approach is advanced here that relies on a Coase-like mechanism that transfers control of government spending to the voter. Prisoner's dilemma incentives and political competition are seen to be critical to the superiority of the present mechanism to approaches requiring budget balance.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2007-12en
dc.subject.jelH61en
dc.subject.jelH62en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpolitical incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordgovernment spendingen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordbalanced budget amendmentsen
dc.titleA Simple Coase-Like Mechanism that Transfers Control of Government Spending Levels from Politicians to Voters-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558073867en
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5526en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
192.26 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.