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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5436
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This article investigates a tax competition model where countries compete for capital and profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs) through statutory tax rates and cross-border loss-offset provisions, which allow a transfer of foreign subsidiaries’ losses to the parent company. A joint implementation of full cross-border loss-relief is welfare maximizing, because it ensures production efficiency and no profit shifting in equilibrium. Local governments choose zero level of the loss-relief in a noncooperative equilibrium, if only capital is mobile and relax the loss-offset, when MNEs engage in profit shifting. Therefore, allowing multinationals to undertake international tax planning activities may be welfare-improving in our model.
Schlagwörter: 
cross-border loss-offset
tax competition
profit shifting
JEL: 
H32
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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