Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107857 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 14-144/II
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare maximizers can be jungle equilibria. This result is due to myopia. We introduce the concept of farsightedness and show that farsighted jungle equilibria coincide with lexicographic welfare maximization. However, we also find farsighted equilibria that are Pareto inefficient since stronger agents may withhold goods from weaker agents. Here, gift giving by stronger agents is needed to achieve Pareto efficiency. We argue that even trade has a role in the jungle. Our results add to understanding coercion and the subtle role of gift giving and trade in an economy purely based on po wer relations.
Schlagwörter: 
power
coercion
jungle economy
farsightedness
withholding
JEL: 
D51
D61
P52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
153.4 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.