Browsen in EconStor gesamt nach Autor:innen Kazumura, Tomoya
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Erscheinungsjahr | Titel | Autor:innen |
2015 | Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences | Kazumura, Tomoya; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
2016 | Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects | Tajika, Tomoya; Kazumura, Tomoya |
2017 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity | Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
2017 | Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage | Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
2020 | Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation with money: (Non)decreasing marginal valuations without quasi-linearity | Shinozaki, Hiroki; Kazumura, Tomoya; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
2020 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity | Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro |