Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148200
Authors: 
Tajika, Tomoya
Kazumura, Tomoya
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 972
Abstract: 
We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known thatWalrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the incentive property of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects. Given a set of agents and a preference profile, an agent i asymptotically dominates an agent j if at sufficiently many objects, i's incremental valuation is higher than j's incremental valuation. We show that for each economy, if there is no agent asymptotically dominating the other agents, and if there are sufficiently many objects, any Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the economy. We also consider replica economies, and show that for each economy, if it is replicated sufficiently many times, the minimum price Walrasian mechanisms are non-manipulable at the replica economy.
Subjects: 
Non-manipulability
Walrasian mechanism
Vickrey mechanism
asymptotic domination
replica economy
submodular preferences
JEL: 
D44
D71
D61
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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