Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98707
Authors: 
Budzinski, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 87
Abstract: 
Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of international cartels, the handling of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the governance of international antitrust cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits. However, they also entail several caveats. Three possible working problems and downside effects of lead jurisdiction models in international competition policy enforcement are discussed in this paper.
Subjects: 
international competition policy
lead jurisdiction models
international governance
interjurisdictional cooperation
interagency cooperation
competition economics
antitrust
JEL: 
F02
F53
F55
K21
L40
D02
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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