Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98500 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 551-585
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflictbetween risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use Ellison's [1] Radius-Coradius Theorem to present prominent results on local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning in a localandin a global- interactions setting.
Subjects: 
coordination games
learning
local interactions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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