Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96733
Authors: 
Bartoš, Vojtěch
Bauer, Michal
Chytilová, Julie
Matějka, Filip
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 8058
Abstract: 
We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. Our model of allocation of costly attention implies that applicants from negatively stereotyped groups face attention discrimination: less attention in highly selective cherry-picking markets, where more attention helps applicants, and more attention in lemon-dropping markets, where it harms them. To test the prediction, we integrate tools to monitor information acquisition into correspondence field experiments. In both countries we study we find that unfavorable signals, minority names, or unemployment, systematically reduce employers' efforts to inspect resumes. Also consistent with the model, in the rental housing market, which is much less selective than labor markets, we find landlords acquire more information about minority relative to majority applicants. We discuss implications of endogenous attention for magnitude and persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, returns to human capital and, potentially, for policy.
Subjects: 
discrimination
attention
field experiment
monitoring information acquisition
JEL: 
C93
D83
J15
J71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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