Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96581
Authors: 
Myrseth, Kristian Ove R.
Riener, Gerhard
Wollbrant, Conny
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ESMT Working Paper 13-04
Abstract: 
The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract (merely numbers on-screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also include psychometric measures of self-control and impulsivity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible a stronger positive association between cooperation and self-control - and a stronger negative association between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results shed light on the conditions under which self-control matters for cooperation.
Subjects: 
Self-control
pro-social behavior
public good experiment
temptation
JEL: 
D01
D03
D64
D70
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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