Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95291
Authors: 
Demichelis, Stefano
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni di Dipartimento 173
Abstract: 
We show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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