Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94637
Authors: 
Filson, Darren
Keen, Edward
Fruits, Eric
Borcherding, Thomas E.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics 2000-31
Abstract: 
Antitrust enforcement makes it difficult to test theories of cartel formation because most attempts to form cartels are blocked. However, federal laws allow U.S. produce growers to operate marketing cartels through devices called marketing orders. These cartels use quantity controls and quality standards to raise prices on fresh produce. Some growers have adopted marketing orders and others have not. This paper develops and tests a positive theory of the adoption of marketing orders. The theory suggests that growers in a region are more likely to adopt a marketing order if the demand for fresh produce is inelastic, the growersÂ’ market share in the fresh market is large, there are barriers to entry and expansion, the fraction of the output the growers ship to the fresh market is not too large or too small, growers are homogeneous, and large cooperatives exist. Probit analyses support these hypotheses.
Subjects: 
marketing order
cartel
collusion
empirical
agriculture
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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