Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94574
Authors: 
Filson, Darren
Fabre, Fernando
Nava, Alfredo
Rodriguez, Paola
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics 2000-32
Abstract: 
This paper provides theoretical explanations for devices that movie distributors use to avoid head-to-head competition. We use a simple static model to show how revenuse sharing exhibition contracts providex multiplex owners with incentives to take cross effects on demand into account. Then we simulate a dynamic version of the model to explian the practice of staggering the release dates of hit movies and consider how vertical integration affects release patterns and the allocation of movies to screens. The dynamic model is of independent interest because it allows for dynamic strategic interaction in a common agency framework.
Subjects: 
common agent
exclusive dealing
entertainment
film
licensing
JEL: 
L14
L22
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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