Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94244 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1999-02
Verlag: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior to uniform tariffs as insurance mechanisms. Moreover, we demonstrate that the optimal uniform policy may involve a tariff at all, but rather might entail an export tax. We also show that a tax cum subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) improves welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
antidumping
contingent protection
insurance
JEL: 
F13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
130.25 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.