Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94224 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013-03
Verlag: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper studies the role of information transparency on fairness concerns, welfare and efficiency. When the firm's productivity and ultimately profits are revealed, wage offers induce relatively fair divisions of potential gains and workers respond with higher performance. Workers respond not only to wages but also to firms' intentions concerning fairness. Information transparency serves as a mechanism that promotes fairness and performance while the lack of transparency results in reduced earnings for workers and market inefficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
Experiments
Incomplete Contracts
Fairness
Information Transparency
experimental economics
incomplete contracts
fairness
information transparency
JEL: 
C9
D8
J
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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