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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 445
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
I examine how a firm's opportunity to verify information influences the joint use of verifiable and unverifiable information for incentive contracting. I employ a simple two-period agency model, in which contract frictions arise from limited liability and the potential unverifiability of the principal's information about the agent's action. With short-term contract, the principal benefits from both a more informative and a more conservative verification of his private information. With long-term contracts, he may prefer a less informative verification, but his preference for a conservative verification persists.
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