Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94033 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 371
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. 'Steeper' securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, the generalized equity auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner tends to outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing emerges without risk aversion or limited liability.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
agency problems
licensing
innovation
mechanism design
JEL: 
D21
D43
D44
D45
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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