Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92865
Autor:innen: 
Morimoto, Shuhei
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 852
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the problems of allocating several heterogeneous objects owned by governments to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Nonquasi-linear preferences describe environments in which large-scale payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule that satisfies the desirable properties of strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on the domain that includes nonquasi-linear preferences. This result does not only recommend the MPW rule based on those desirable properties, but also suggest that governments cannot improve upon the MPW rule once they consider them essential. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result explains the pervasive use of the SA auction.
Schlagwörter: 
minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
simultaneous ascending auction
strategy-proofness
efficiency
heterogeneous objects
nonquasi-linear preferences
JEL: 
D44
D71
D61
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
490.12 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.