Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88627
Authors: 
Wenzel, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 126
Abstract: 
This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshrouding mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information depends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding becomes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With unshrouding costs a non-monotonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may arise.
Subjects: 
Bounded rationality
Add-on pricing
Shrouding
JEL: 
D40
D80
L10
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-125-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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