Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88431
Authors: 
Heuson, Clemens
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
UFZ Discussion Papers 18/2013
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollu-tion problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less 'green' than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts, which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emis-sions. However, the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmen-tal damages, which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date, alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.
Subjects: 
strategic delegation
global pollution problems
self-protection
non-cooperative behaviour
JEL: 
C72
D72
H41
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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