Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88417
Authors: 
Quaas, Martin F.
Stoeven, Max T.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper, Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2012-02 [rev.]
Abstract: 
Renewable resources provide society with resource rent and surpluses for resource users (the processing industry, consumers) and owners of production factors (capital and labor employed in resource harvesting). We show that resource users and factor owners may favor inefficiently high harvest rates up to open-access levels. This may explain why public resource management is often very inefficient. We further show that privatizing inefficiently managed resources would cause losses for resource users and factor owners, unless (a) the stock is severely depleted and (b) the discount rate is low. We quantify our results for the Northeast Arctic Cod fishery
Subjects: 
resource rent
consumer surplus
worker surplus
distribution
political economy
JEL: 
Q28
D33
D72
Q57
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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