Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87141
Authors: 
Bertoletti, Paolo
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni di Dipartimento, EPMQ, Università degli Studi di Pavia 179
Abstract: 
According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of (fullyinformed) potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply if the seller regards the bidders' private valuations as belonging to the class of identical and independent distributions with a monotonic hazard rate.
Subjects: 
all-pay auctions
Exclusion Principle
monotonic hazard rate
economic theory of lobbying
JEL: 
D44
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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