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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CoFE Discussion Paper No. 99/02
Verlag: 
University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE), Konstanz
Zusammenfassung: 
This peper anlyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un- equal per-capita capital endownments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (or any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national welfare costs and benefits of tax rate varia- tions are shown to be ambiguous in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium due to the existence of tax base and terms of trade effects. Moreover, numerical simulation results indicate that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are inefficient from an international perspective, even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments available to fiscal authorities.
JEL: 
H2
H4
H7
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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