Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85183
Authors: 
Eggert, Wolfgang
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
CoFE Discussion Paper 99/02
Abstract: 
This peper anlyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un- equal per-capita capital endownments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (or any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national welfare costs and benefits of tax rate varia- tions are shown to be ambiguous in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium due to the existence of tax base and terms of trade effects. Moreover, numerical simulation results indicate that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are inefficient from an international perspective, even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments available to fiscal authorities.
JEL: 
H2
H4
H7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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