Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85020
Authors: 
Bone, John
Crosetto, Paolo
Hey, John D.
Pasca, Carmen
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-029
Abstract: 
This paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social dividends, according to principles chosen beforehand by subjects themselves from behind a stylised Rawlsian veil of ignorance, or outside the society on which the principles will be implemented. We test the attractiveness in particular of Luck Egalitarianism, compensating inequalities due to chance but not those due to choice. We find modest but not overwhelming support for these principles, suggesting that subjects´ actual preferences are more complex.
Subjects: 
chance
choice
envy-freeness
fairness
luck
luck egalitarianism
responsibility
JEL: 
D31
D63
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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