Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84373
Authors: 
Streb, Jorge M.
Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del CEMA: Área: ciencias políticas 286
Abstract: 
In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.
Subjects: 
political budget cycles
asymmetric information
discretion
separation of powers
checks and balances
veto players
rule of law
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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