Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83059
Authors: 
Brandt, Urs Steiner
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark 40
Abstract: 
When abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes pri-vately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.
Subjects: 
International environmental problems
unilateral reductions
signal-ling costs
JEL: 
Q28
H4
D8
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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