Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81257 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 621
Publisher: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Abstract: 
We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions result in coordinated effects. In particular, higher market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and, consequently, the relevance of simple checklists in merger control can be questioned.
Subjects: 
Merger Control
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Oligopolistic Dominance
Competition Policy
JEL: 
D43
L13
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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