Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79187
Authors: 
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2002,27
Abstract: 
In this paper we develop a theory of “Kosher Wars” under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi’s rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America’s voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.
Subjects: 
dietary restrictions
Kashrut
kosher
religion
rent-seeking
JEL: 
D71
D72
Z12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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