Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78413
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 17/2000
Abstract: 
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric equilibria, however, one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative weight.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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