Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78411
Authors: 
Abbink, Klaus
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Pezanis-Christou, Paul
Rockenbach, Bettina
Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
Selten, Reinhard
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 25/2001
Abstract: 
In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were suggested by the government: a discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs, and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency, revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction gives new entrants better chances.
Subjects: 
Spectrum auctions
UMTS
experiments
JEL: 
C90
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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