Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75007
Authors: 
Hartigan, James C.
Vandenbussche, Hylke
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper 253
Abstract: 
This paper develops a model that offers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of diffusion of antidumping (AD) laws amongst WTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an infinite horizon game. The diffusion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner.s dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers.
Subjects: 
Antidumping
non-cooperative games
WTO
proliferation
JEL: 
F11
F14
F16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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