Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74993
Authors: 
Collie, David R.
Vandenbussche, Hylke
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper 149
Abstract: 
The Byrd amendment to US anti-dumping law distributes the revenue from anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. When the government sets its anti-dumping duty to maximise a welfare function that attaches greater weight to the profits of the domestic industry than to consumer surplus or tax revenue, it is shown that the Byrd amendment will lead to lower duties and higher welfare if the weight on the profits of the domestic industry is sufficiently large. Also, the Byrd amendment makes it less likely that the anti-dumping duty will be prohibitive.
Subjects: 
Tariffs
US trade policy
WTO
Cournot oligopoly.
JEL: 
F12
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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