Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74887
Authors: 
Casini, Paolo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper 266
Abstract: 
We analyze an oligopolistic microcredit market characterized by asymmetric infirmation and institutions that can offer only one type of contract. We study the effects of competition on contract choice when small entrepreneurs can borrow from more than one institution due to the absence of credit bureaus. We show that appropriate contract design can eliminate the ex-ante incentives for multiple borrowing. Moreover, when the market is still largely unserved and particularly risky, a screening strategy leading to contract differentiation and credit rationing is unambiguously the most effective to avoid multiple borrowing.
Subjects: 
Microfinance
Competition
Credit Bureaus
Multiple Borrowing
Credit Rationing
JEL: 
G21
L13
L31
O16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
241.37 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.