Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74640
Authors: 
Deimen, Inga
Ketelaar, Felix
Le Quement, Mark T.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2013
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan (2000) for the classical model, full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of the first best decision rule via truthful equilibria.
Subjects: 
Communication
Committees
Voting
JEL: 
D72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
641.21 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.