Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74635
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2011
Abstract: 
Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the rules of the game by systematically withholding e¤ort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con- test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of high-ability participants in the first period. Such sandbagging can be ben- eficial to avoid second-period matches against other high-ability opponents. I characterize the conditions under which sandbagging leads to a coordina- tion problem, similar to that of the battle-of-the sexes game. Moreover, if players' abilities have a stronger impact on the outcome of the first-period contest than e¤ort choices, mutual sandbagging by all high-ability players can arise.
Subjects: 
ecoordination problem
dynamic contest
heterogeneous contestants
withholding effort
JEL: 
C72
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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