Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73174 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics No. 241
Verlag: 
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lüneburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the regulation of a morally responsible agent in the context of a negative consumption externality and motivation crowding. In particular, we analyze how various governmental interventions affect the agent's motivation to assume moral responsibility. Employing a motivation-crowding model, we find that morally motivated behavior will, in general, not ensure Pareto efficiency without intervention. A Pigouvian tax may be efficient under motivation crowding. But the efficient taxe rate needs to be higher, which may lead to a full crowding-out of moral motivation. By contrast, an inefficiently low taxe rate may increase the market failure due to motivation crowding. Provision of information is efficient only in very specific cases but may be effective in reducing the extent of market failure. A complementary tax-and-information policy approach is superior to a tax as single instrument if its aim is to reduce consumption and if provision of information raises moral motivation.
Schlagwörter: 
Altruism
externality
moral motivation
motivation crowding
Pareto efficiency
regulation
responsibility
taxes
provision of information
JEL: 
D03
D11
D62
H23
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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