Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71062
Authors: 
Chatelain, Jean-Bernard
Ralf, Kirsten
Amable, Bruno
Year of Publication: 
16-Mar-2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control [ISSN:] 0165-1889 [Volume:] 34 [Issue:] 6 [Pages:] 1094-1104
Abstract: 
This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.
Subjects: 
Patents
Collateral
Growth
Innovation
Research and Development
Credit rationing
JEL: 
D9
G2
G3
O1
O3
O4
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

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