Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70150
Authors: 
Cicognani, Simona
D'Ambrosio, Anna
Güth, Werner
Pfuderer, Sinome
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012,015
Abstract: 
We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either complete or only private information about others' personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games which are experimentally implemented and analysed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on truth-telling as an obvious and simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they yield to strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects' characteristics, the provision mechanism seems quite functional.
Subjects: 
Public Provision
Procedural Fairness
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
C72
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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