Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68928
Authors: 
Goerke, Laszlo
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie 1, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik, Universität Konstanz 291
Abstract: 
A higher unemployment compensation increases the incentive to shirk in efficiency wage models. If there is a stronger dependence of unemployment benefits on current earnings, these incentives will be reduced. An unemployment insurance with earnings-related benefits is thus characterised by higher employment than one with flat-rate benefits. It is investigated under which conditions this advantage persists in the longer term when financial constraints such as an ex-post constant level of benefits, a cash hmit or a balanced budget rule apply, or when firms are constrained to zero profits.
Subjects: 
balanced budget
cash limit
earnings-related benefits
efficiency wages
flat-rate benefits
long-run
unemployment insurance
JEL: 
H24
H25
J32
J41
J65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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