Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68886
Authors: 
Schulze, Günther G.
Frank, Björn
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie 1, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz 303
Abstract: 
This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.
Subjects: 
corruption
gender
intrinsic motivation
reciprocity
JEL: 
C91
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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