Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68228 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 81
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for pro…table and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant …rm are most effective in this regard. Remedial divestitures are most attractive from a social welfare point of view, when the merging parties can extract the entire gains associated with the asset sale. We also show that the merging parties have strong incentives to search for the most efficient buyer. Finally, we identify instances so that a remedy rule induces strictly price-decreasing mergers.
Schlagwörter: 
Remedies
Divestiture
Merger Control
Oligopoly
Synergies
JEL: 
L13
L41
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-080-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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