Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66767
Authors: 
Ślązak, Emil
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] e-Finanse: Financial Internet Quarterly [ISSN:] 1734-039X [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 76-91
Abstract: 
The article aims at comparative analysis of the nature and dimensions of credit rationing on the grounds of theory of finance. The paper identifies the essence of credit rationing through the prism of its most important endogenous and exogenous prerequisites, assuming the lack of adequate instruments that could be used by banks to individually select borrowers (the so-called screening devices) in conditions of their heterogeneous risk-related breakdown. The paper points out the scope of idiosyncratic attributes of the credit market which prevent it from achieving a state of Walrasian equilibrium, which leads to petrification of credit market imperfections (credit market failure).
Subjects: 
credit rationing
information asymmetry
market imperfections
JEL: 
G21
G14
G32
Document Type: 
Article

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