Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Güth, Werner
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,104
If one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or commodity exchanges, (international) trade relies on bargaining between the interested parties. Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely defined concept of (relative) bargaining power, it is simply a field of application in view of game theory. Our discussion tries to elaborate the specific institutional aspects of international bargaining with interacting parties from different countries. Especially, we concentrate on the problem when contracts resulting from international bargaining are unenforceable.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
170.73 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.