Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/65789 
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dc.contributor.authorMatthews, Kenten
dc.contributor.authorMatthews, Owenen
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-02T14:28:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-02T14:28:17Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/65789-
dc.description.abstractThe positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that the cushioning of banks downside risks provide the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. Macro-prudential regulation will have a better chance of curbing excess risk taking than controlling banker’s compensation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCardiff University, Cardiff Business School |cCardiffen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCardiff Economics Working Papers |xE2009/27en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbanker’s bonusen
dc.subject.keywordrisk takingen
dc.subject.keywordtoo-big-to-failen
dc.subject.keywordmacro-prudential regulationen
dc.subject.stwBanken
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarktkriseen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleControlling banker's bonuses: Efficient regulation or politics of envy?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn622724703en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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