Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/65689 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorGuerrazzi, Marcoen
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-01T13:55:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-01T13:55:26Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/65689-
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to represent wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, by assuming that employment follows a stock adjustment principle towards the level that maximises profits, i.e., towards labour demand, we build an intertemporal optimising model in which the real wage is continuously set by an infinitely-lived omniscient arbitrator that is called in to resolve the dispute between the workers and the employers. Our theoretical proposal allows to show that unions may speed up the adjustment to equilibrium and it suggests that standard (static) models may understate the distortions implied by wage bargaining.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe Open University, Economics Department |cMilton Keynesen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aOpen Discussion Papers in Economics |x61en
dc.subject.jelC61en
dc.subject.jelE24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWage Bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Control Theoryen
dc.subject.keywordRight-to-Manage Modelen
dc.subject.keywordNumerical Solutionsen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwKontrolltheorieen
dc.subject.stwMathematische Optimierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWage bargaining in an optimal control framework: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn534999336en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
326.67 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.