Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65407
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dc.contributor.authorWiederhold, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-23T07:41:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-23T07:41:42Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/65407-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the role of social identity in reactions to control. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups. Our laboratory experiment shows that, in contrast to no-group agents, agents in social groups (i) perform better; (ii) expect less control; (iii) do not reciprocate when facing less control than expected; (iv) decrease their performance substantially when actual control exceeds their expectation. Hidden costs of control thus appear to be more substantial in social groups.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Social Groups |xC06-V2en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleHidden Costs of Control in Social Groupsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn731512766-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:65407-

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